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SO:  This is Sue Onslow talking to Ambassador Kaliopate Tavola in Suva on 
10th April 2014. Sir, thank you very much indeed for agreeing to take part 
in this project. I wonder if you could please begin by reflecting generally 
on Fiji and the Commonwealth. When you came into politics, and then 
into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, what was your general view and 
feeling towards the Commonwealth, and Fiji’s relationship with the 
Commonwealth? 
 
KT:  The Commonwealth, at the time, had a special significance for Fiji. Fiji, at the 
time, was very proud to be a member of the Commonwealth and it goes back 
to the early history of Fiji. In 1874, the chiefs of Fiji decided to cede the 
country to Britain. It was not taken over by an act of war or anything like that, 
so it has a personal significance. 
 
SO:  So this was a commitment by the paramount chief, Ratu Seru Cakobau? 
 
KT:  Yes, to cede Fiji to Great Britain. Queen Victoria was on the throne at the 
time. After three requests, she finally decided to accept the Deed of Cession 
and that was signed in 1874. And that has a lot of significance in the Fijian 
psyche. So, we have that special relationship and, of course, the members of 
the Royal Family have been visiting Fiji from the early days. There was the 
Coronation visit by Queen Elizabeth II. Soon after her Coronation, she came 
to Fiji in December 1953 and our chiefs have always welcomed any members 
of the Royal Family coming to Fiji or going to London and being hosted there. 
So, Fiji was a proud member of the Commonwealth. What happened in 1987 
was a disappointment for a lot of Fijians. We had this nice relationship and 
that came to an end by way of a coup, which was totally unknown in the Fiji 
vocabulary. I mean, people were even pronouncing it ‘coop’ and things like 
that – because it was not in our language. It was something unusual. 
 
SO:  So there is no word for ‘coup’ in the Fijian language? 
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KT:  Oh, there is the word vuaviri. We had had coups traditionally, but in modern 
history and in the Pacific a coup was something we associated with Africa 
and places like that. But in the Pacific it was something unusual. 
 
SO:  Sir, you were in London as Political Counsellor at the High Commission. 
 
KT:  I was in London in 1987 when it [the coup] took place. And I was in a 
Commonwealth grouping – the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau. We were 
down on the southern coast. My wife was in London and she rang up that 
morning and said, “Check out the television.” And there it was: a coup in Fiji. I 
couldn’t believe it. But the television announced it and made quite a 
programme out of it, and when I went to breakfast that morning all my African 
colleagues greeted me, “Welcome to the club.” [Laughter]. 
 
SO:  Oh dear. 
 
KT:  Yes, that was in 1987. 
 
SO:  Yes, there were two coups in 1987. 
 
KT:  In May and then September. This was the May one. 19th May. 
 
SO:  Sir, obviously, you were part of the Fiji Foreign Service, working on 
agriculture at this particular point.  Did it affect your work in any way? 
 
KT:  Well, I had to check [it] out. I was chairing the council of the Commonwealth 
Agricultural Bureau, and I had to check it out whether Fiji was still qualified to 
be part of the CAB. There was no problem with that. I chaired the CAB during 
its transition from being a CAB to CABI – the ‘International’ – and then Prince 
Charles was coming to open the new headquarters, so I had to make sure 
that we moved from London to the new headquarters. 
 
SO:  I think the new HQ is in Oxford. 
 
KT:  Yes. And Prince Charles came to be the guest speaker and Chief Guest. I 
was the chair of the Group. But that was late in 1987. I think that was 
afterwards. But I had to check out whether I was still able to chair the council 
and Fiji’s membership of the CABI. So, it presented no problem at the time, 
but I think to a lot of people – diplomats, Fijians – it was a bit of a 
disappointment, almost an embarrassment, that we were part of a group that 
was regarded highly in Fiji and we are now no longer part of that. We had the 
coup, which dirtied our reputation. 
 
SO:  So, Sir, did you have intense discussion with your High Commissioner 
about Fiji’s particular position that you remember? Did you have 
discussions among the wider diplomatic fraternity in London about 
Fiji’s position, about what was going on back here in Suva? 
 
KT:  Well, I was a Counsellor at the time and yes, we talked about it, and I think 
the realisation was that we were there representing the government – 
whatever government came into authority – and, being diplomats, we just had 
to do what we were told. But I know the fact that we had a coup and the 
possibility of being not part of the Commonwealth was obviously part of the 
discussions that took place. We did enquire, you know, with the authorities at 
the time – that, given the situation in Fiji, would Fiji still be qualified to be part 
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of the council of CABI, for instance? Or, to get the invitation to the Garden 
Party, and to Buckingham Palace? We did try to find out, and there was no 
problem. And I remember meeting Her Majesty and the Royal Family at that 
time. We were still being invited to Buckingham Palace for the receptions and 
I think there was a little exchange: “I hope everything is well in Fiji”, something 
like that. [So] we did get the invitation, but I think there was a feeling of 
disappointment, embarrassment, to some extent. 
 
SO:  So, after Fiji was suspended from the councils of the Commonwealth at 
the Vancouver Heads of Government meeting… 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  …did that, in any way, alter your diplomatic relationship, that you 
recall? 
 
KT:  At the diplomatic level, I recall there was very little change, because we were 
still getting the invitation to the garden party. We went to Buckingham Palace 
for the reception, and my membership of CABI was still there. But we were, 
obviously, not part of the council and a subject that had to be addressed at 
the CMAG…well, the CMAG came later, I think… 
 
SO:  Yes it did. Sir, in 1988 you were transferred to Brussels and were 
appointed as ambassador to Belgium. 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  Were you also accredited to the European Community at that point? 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  So was this part of, then, a particular approach by Fiji to concentrate 
more on the EC than on Britain at this time? 
 
KT:  Yes. I switched completely, and in Brussels I had no role to play as far as the 
Commonwealth was concerned. But we were part of the Lomé Convention at 
the time…and I think the sanctions did apply at the time, as far as Fiji was 
concerned. So, we had to talk about the situation in Fiji, because I think, 
under the Lomé convention, at the time, we had committed a breach of the 
agreement. So there were sanctions that were applied and we had to explain 
the situation to the authorities. 
 
SO:  So, was there a redirection of Fiji’s foreign policy at this point? 
Because, if you were suspended from the councils of the 
Commonwealth, how far did the South Pacific Forum become more 
important for you, or the EC? I’m just wondering how much value was 
attached in Fiji to getting back into the Commonwealth. 
 
KT:  Well, I was not in the country at the time, but I think there was obviously an 
attempt to regularize the situation and to get back to the Commonwealth. But 
in Brussels, of course, my responsibilities were related to membership of the 
ACP Group. But that was in 1988, and after the suspension of Fiji from the 
Commonwealth. 
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SO:  Sir, can I just ask about the way that Fiji foreign policy is formed? Who 
is the key driver in terms of the ministerial portfolio for Fiji’s foreign 
policy? Because, obviously, it varies from country to country… 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  How much latitude does the Foreign Minister have? How much 
responsibility does the Prime Minister have? 
 
KT:  Well, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is, obviously, the driver of foreign policies. 
 
SO:  In day-to-day management of international affairs, or actual strategy? 
 
KT:  Day-to-day and in terms of strategy and policies, yes. He will take policies to 
Cabinet to determine the direction for foreign policies. So, the Minister at that 
time would have been quite active in that respect. 
 
SO:  Yes, okay. So, when Fiji was readmitted to the Commonwealth… 
 
KT:  What year was that? 
 
SO:  In 1997, just before the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting 
in Edinburgh. So, you were still in Brussels? 
 
KT:  In 1997 I was still in Brussels. 
 
SO:  Were you pulled in to come along to the Edinburgh meeting? 
 
KT:  No. I was not involved in any Commonwealth discussions at the time. It was 
1998 when I came back to Fiji, and then I got involved in politics in 2000, after 
the coup of 2000. And that’s when I really got involved in the Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  Sir, please could you talk about the events of 2000, then? Obviously, 
there was the George Speight-led coup in which MPs were held hostage 
in the Parliament Building. Were you here in Suva? 
 
KT:  I was in Suva. I was working for the Fiji Sugar Marketing Company at the 
time, and then I was asked to be part of the interim government. I talked 
about it with my bosses at the time and it really was because of the interest in 
our sugar markets and my background in sugar markets that I got the nod 
from my sugar bosses: “Yes, I think it would be good, if you’re going in as 
Foreign Affairs Minister, that you’ll still be looking after the sugar market.” So, 
it really was the sugar interest that persuaded my bosses in the sugar 
industry to release me. 
 
SO:  How important was sugar to Fiji’s foreign exchange earnings at this 
point? I know that tourism had dramatically increased in terms of the 
sector’s contribution to Fiji’s foreign earnings, but where was sugar at 
this point? 
 
KT:  Sugar was obviously the major agricultural export for Fiji and I think the sugar 
industry, at that time, as a percentage of GDP, was quite high. It’s not as high 
now. I think it was 18% to 20%. But what was an important consideration was 
that we used to use the figure [that] about a quarter of the population of Fiji - 
20% to 25% – were dependent on the sugar industry in one way or another. 
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So, in terms of the economy, it was a big industry – very, very important – and 
we needed to sustain the industry. So, that was one consideration that was 
important for the sugar industry to release me to go to the interim government 
at the time – as caretaker, Foreign Minister, in the interim government. So, I 
was there from 2000 to 2005... No, 2001, I think, was the General Elections. 
So, I came back to the sugar industry and I said, “Look, I’ve done my interim 
job, what do you think?” And again, my bosses said, “Okay, you stay in 
politics.” So I fought the General Elections and got a seat in parliament. 
 
SO:  For the United Fiji Party? 
 
KT:  For the SDL Party, at the time. 
 
SO:  I apologise, my notes are wrong here, because I have you as a 
candidate for the United Fiji Party to represent Lami… 
 
KT:  No, the SDL Party, Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua, which is now the 
SODELPA Party. And I represented the Lami Open constituency. So, I stayed 
in Parliament for five years and also in the Cabinet as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs; it was at a time when I did a lot of work for the Commonwealth and 
tried to get Fiji back into the Commonwealth. I remember, still, attending a lot 
of Commonwealth meetings – even the Heads of Government meetings, the 
one that was held in Australia… 
 
SO:  In Coolum? 
 
KT:  …yes, Coolum. I attended the one in Nigeria in Abuja. And it was after the 
Abuja meeting that Don McKinnon asked me to attend a special CMAG in 
London where I had to make a submission on behalf of the Fiji Government. It 
was at that CMAG meeting where the decision was taken to return Fiji to the 
Commonwealth. Now, what year was that…that was after the Abuja meeting? 
2003. 
 
SO:  So often the significance of the Abuja CHOGM is attached to Zimbabwe, 
because this was when Robert Mugabe announced Zimbabwe’s 
immediate withdrawal from the Commonwealth. 
 
KT:  It was confirmed after the Abuja meeting, in London. 
 
SO:  So that’s May 2004. Does that sound about right? 
 
KT:  Yes, in London. 
 
SO:  Sir, if I could please just take you back to the time of the interim 
government. I would very much like to ask you about these discussions 
at Coolum and Abuja, as well. You were involved in the interim 
government… 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  How much foreign activity were you involved with? Were you required 
to deal with foreign visitors – be they the Secretary General, be they 
representatives of Australia or New Zealand – who were trying to 
encourage or pressure Fiji’s return to democracy? Or, were you in fact 
concentrating on other political aspects of Fiji’s foreign relations? 
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KT:  Well, I think one of my main tasks in the interim government at the time was 
to try to regularize the relations with Australia, with New Zealand, and we 
were still attending the Commonwealth meetings because I think we were still 
a member of the council at the time… 
 
SO:  Yes, Fiji was not suspended until June of 2000. 
 
KT:  2000. 
 
SO:  The Speight putsch was 19 May – 13 July of 2000. Were you in 
discussion with the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group before 
June of 2000, or were you involved afterwards? Do you recall? 
 
KT:  It would have been afterwards, I would think. I attended a couple of CMAG 
meetings. One was in New York, at the margin of the General Assembly… 
 
SO:  Yes, in September. 
 
KT:  …in September, and that one in London after the Abuja meeting, and it was 
after that submission where the decision was made to allow Fiji to re-enter the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  Can you tell me please, Sir, what was your view of the CMAG process? 
 
KT:  It’s a good mechanism. I mean, we would support the role of the CMAG. If a 
member has breached the rules, then that member needs to be interrogated; 
and, after the sentence had been applied, it created an avenue – an 
opportunity – for Fiji to be heard, to be still heard. And I remember, in Abuja, 
Don McKinnon asked me specifically to be present at the London meeting. 
Yes. In Abuja, Fiji was not at the margin; Fiji was part of the Commonwealth. 
We sat in the… 
 
SO:  You sat in the Executive session? 
 
KT:  Yes. And I queued up to meet Her Majesty again, so I didn’t feel as if I was 
being at the margin or being excluded. 
 
SO:  That’s very interesting, because official Commonwealth story likes to 
present itself as sending Fiji ‘to Coventry’ – to use that English 
expression. 
 
KT:  Yes. Well, when you front up to the CMAG, you feel as if you are under the 
spotlight. But at the Heads of the Commonwealth meeting, it was just normal. 
I mean, I was there. We met Her Majesty. So there was no problem. I was in 
the photograph, for instance. 
 
SO:  The politics of photographs always intrigues me. Who were you allowed 
to stand next to? You weren’t pushed right to the end?  
 
KT:  No, no! There was free standing for most of us. I met with Her Majesty and 
she enquired about Fiji and I said we were doing our best to get back to the 
Commonwealth. Something like that, yes. 
 
SO:  Yes. That would have pleased her. 
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KT:  Yes, yes. It is this special relationship that Fiji has with the Commonwealth 
and with the Royal Family. They have this personal interest; they want to 
know about Fiji and all that, and so… 
 
SO:  Even after Fiji declared itself a republic? 
 
KT:  That was in 1989. Yes. 
 
SO:  But there is still an ongoing sense of a particular relationship with the 
Queen, because of the cession? 
 
KT:  Yes. Well, you know, when Rabuka declared a republic, that was not a 
popular declaration. Pictures of the Queen in many Fijian homes didn’t come 
down and they are still there. 
 
SO:  They stayed up? 
 
KT:  They stayed up and they’re kept in very visible places, in all Fijian homes. 
You go to Fijian homes and the Royal Family photos are there. They didn’t 
come down when we were declared a republic. But it created a lot of 
confusion, too, because we became a republic but the people still regarded 
the Queen as the Head of state, when she was no longer under the legal 
arrangement that we had at the time. So, again, it just emphasises that 
special relationship, the bond, that Fiji has with the Crown. And that bond is 
still there. 
 
SO:  If I could ask, is that bond still there for a particular generation, or have 
the ties loosened with younger Fijians? 
 
KT:  Yes, I think it is loosening a bit with the younger generations coming in. But 
the history never changes, and so people who read about the history and all 
that, they would certainly develop that personal relationship and interest in it. 
 
SO:  Sir, if I could take you back to being involved in the CMAG process, 
were you invited to make a written submission beforehand? 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  So, you and your staff put together argumentation on Fiji’s process 
towards democracy… 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  …and constitutionalism? 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  Is that how it works? 
 
KT:  The report had to indicate what we were doing to return Fiji to a democracy. 
And that was the kind of thing that had to be reflected in the report and, I 
think, in London, after the Abuja meeting, there were a lot of positive 
developments. We had created the coalition government, at the time, under 
the Constitution – the formation of a coalition government, involving the 
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opposition, and that was a blast for Fiji. So, it was on the basis of the positive 
steps that were being taken at the time, CMAG made the decision to lift the 
suspension. 
 
SO: Sir, I would be grateful if you could reflect on Fiji’s experience of the 
 CMAG process. 
 
KT:  I think CMAG, as a process… I think it is needed. You cannot debate on that. 
A member of the group has breached the constitution of the group, and that 
member is subject to interrogations and the enquiry and all that; that’s fine. 
We didn’t have any problem with that; we looked at it positively. We agreed 
that it [the CMAG process] was an avenue that we could pursue to get back 
into the Commonwealth and we did use it positively. So, as I was saying, we 
took the opportunity to write the report to reflect the processes and the 
measures that we were taking to regularize the situation in Fiji. And I fronted 
up to CMAG. One was in New York, at the margin of the General Assembly, 
and the one in London, after the Abuja Heads of Government meeting. And 
so we used the opportunity of the CMAG to tell our stories. Part of the work I 
was doing – when I got into government and into Cabinet – was to tell the 
story of what we were trying to do to return the country to democracy. And we 
were very much aware of that and we wanted to take full advantage of that 
opportunity and that avenue that was open to us, through the CMAG: to go 
and tell the Commonwealth the story, the good things that we were doing. 
 
SO:  Sir, was this controversial in Cabinet? Were there those who were 
 critical of Fiji’s attempts to rejoin the Commonwealth? And who felt Fiji 
 was suspended and that the country should concentrate its energies 
 elsewhere and in other diplomatic forums? 
 
KT:  In Cabinet, we were united: we were once a trusted member of the 
Commonwealth, and we wanted to get back in. So, we were trying to do 
everything we could to regularize the situation – to regularize the situation 
with Australia and New Zealand, very important. 
 
SO:  How were you trying to do this? 
 
KT:  Through the various missions. For instance, the Australian High 
Commissioner at the time was Sue Boyd, a good friend of mine, and we used 
to dialogue quite a lot. And Sue would ring up and say, “Look, I can’t come to 
you publicly, but I’ve got a nice bottle of red here. I’ll come to your place.” So, 
she would come home and we would talk, and that would go back to 
Canberra. And, similarly, with New Zealand. So, we were open to 
discussions, because the Interim government at that time – and the 
government that came in after the 2001 Election – wanted to regularize the 
situation. 
 
SO:  You seem to be describing more of a regional South Pacific 
Forum/Pacific Islands Forum way of encouraging Fiji’s re-engagement 
with the Commonwealth? 
 
KT:  As I said, it was because of the personal relationship that Fiji has with the  
 Commonwealth, so we were united that we needed to get back to the 
 Commonwealth. So, it was Fiji’s own initiative to get back. 
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SO:  Sir, did you have much engagement with the Secretary General, Don 
McKinnon, on this? You said that he had invited you to come to the 
CMAG meeting… 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  …in London, after the Abuja Heads of Government meeting. Did you 
also have contacts with the Secretariat? Was Don McKinnon phoning 
you up to give suggestions of what might be included in the report? 
Were there any other inputs in that way? 
 
KT:  Through the Secretary General. He sent envoys to come to Fiji just to assess 
the situation, and I think the envoy did come twice when… 
 
SO:  This is Pius Langa, from South Africa? 
 
KT:  He came at one time. Sir Paul Reeves came twice, I think, and that was on 
the initiative of the Secretary General. And we welcomed the envoys when 
they came. 
 
SO:  I’ve heard that Ratu Mara, who was still President at this point, was 
initially rather sceptical of their input, suggesting that Pius Langa would 
not have known – as a South African – much about the particular Fijian 
context? 
 
KT:   Yes. Well, maybe that was his private attitude and view, but we in the Cabinet 
welcomed him, and we didn’t have any difficulties with him making an 
evaluation of the situation in Fiji at the time. 
 
SO:  Obviously, Ratu Mara, as the leading politician before and after Fiji’s 
independence, had an enormous authority and experience here in Fiji. 
How much executive power did he have as President? 
 
KT:  The President of Fiji has very little executive power, so it was left to the 
Cabinet – and particularly to the initiative of the Foreign Minister – to 
determine the foreign policies for the country. 
 
SO:  I was just wondering, Sir, that if Ratu Mara had little formal executive 
power, whether he could still have an enormous amount of informal 
influence and input? 
 
KT:  I think, at the time, he had probably decided, “I’ve done my bit. The others 
that are coming in now, they can do what they can without my intervention.” 
So, I didn’t feel at the time that he was trying to look and pull strings from the 
top. 
 
SO:  So, Sir, did you have much contact and engagement with Pius Langa 
and Sir Paul Reeves? 
 
KT:  Yes, when they came we were the host Ministry. We had to look after them 
and, again, we had to tell the story from the ministerial perspective. Both 
listened and we facilitated their visit and all their meetings. And it was quite 
open. They met who they wanted to meet, and we didn’t get in the way. 
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SO:  And would they then report back to you on the outcome of their 
discussions? Obviously, they were the Secretary General’s envoys, but 
I just wondered about the diplomatic courtesies? 
 
KT:  There would be a debriefing at the end of the visit, but their report would go to 
the Secretary General. 
 
SO:  How useful did you find this process of Special Envoy engagement? 
 
KT:  I think it was useful for us in having an outsider looking in at what we were 
doing – because we were keen, we were determined, to regularize the 
situation. And that is why we welcomed the envoys to come in and make their 
own assessments. And we didn’t see anything wrong with that because we 
were determined to do the right thing and to regularize, to get back into 
normality and into the Commonwealth organisation and all that; so, I think it 
was a great help. 
 
SO:  Sir, as Foreign Minister from 2001 to 2005, you had to defend Fiji’s 
international position about the treatment of those who were involved in 
the coup of 2000. Did particular criticism come from the Commonwealth, 
or from the Pacific region? 
 
KT:  We defended what was right – human rights, for instance – and we 
acknowledged if there was anything wrong. Certainly, we didn’t justify the 
coup. It was unconstitutional and was wrong. So, the focus really was just to 
do the right thing. And to regularize our relations and to make good the 
situation that was bad. So, that was really our focus and we would 
acknowledge what was good and we would say, truthfully, what was wrong. I 
remember saying, “You cannot support the coup. It’s unconstitutional and it is 
not right. But that is the past. That is the situation we are facing. What we 
want to do now is to make good. Regularize it. Get it better.” 
 
SO:  Were there any particular countries or governments who were critical of 
Fiji’s perceived lenience, to which you had to give particular energy and 
attention?  
 
KT:  Well, Australia and New Zealand, because we faced sanctions at the time. 
And so a major part of our effort was directed at Australia and New Zealand 
and the Forum was very much involved in that, to facilitate the meeting. I 
remember…was it in 2000?...the first ever meeting of Foreign Affairs 
Ministers of the Forum was held in Samoa. And the Solomon Islands, also, 
was in the bad book in those days, because of the riot there. So, the Foreign 
Minister of the Solomon Islands and I… I think that was the first ever meeting 
of the Foreign Affairs Ministers, which was in August of 2000 in Apia. We 
were asked specifically to be there to answer to the interrogation. 
 
SO:  So did the Forum, in any way, adopt a CMAG-style process? 
 
KT:  Well, that was an interesting one, because it was a new development. As I 
said, it was the first ever meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers and then, at 
that meeting, it lead to the Biketawa Declaration. The Biketawa Declaration 
was declared in October 2000 by the leaders – after that first meeting of the 
Foreign Affairs Ministers in Apia. And so the Biketawa Declaration was 
declared, and that became the guideline. It was kind of a CMAG approach: to 
subject the country that was at fault to some enquiries. And Fiji is still under 
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that Biketawa Declaration. The Ministerial Contact Group was here not long 
ago. 
 
SO:  So, how far do you think that the Commonwealth, then, had been a pilot 
fish in developing international institutions, international input, [and] 
international criticism in an organised forum? 
 
KT:  The relevant documentation of the group that was there provided the 
guidelines for behaviour as part of a group. So, that was a good thing about 
the Commonwealth. There were rules to observe, and if you don’t follow the 
rules, then you are subject to some enquiries. I think that is something that 
the Commonwealth can teach to other organisations. I know at the Lomé 
Convention we have that same kind of arrangement: under Article 96 of 
Lomé, where, if you breach the Lomé accord, then you would be subject to 
enquiries. I was also subjected to that, and had to go to Brussels to explain 
the situation we were facing in Fiji and try to lift the sanctions. So, there were 
parallel kinds of situations existing at the time. 
 
SO:  Sir, was there any UN oversight, sanction and input? Or was this really 
dealt with on a regional basis and an institutional basis through Lomé, 
as you say? 
 
KT:  Yes. The effort was, obviously, under the Commonwealth – because we were 
being watched by CMAG – and under the Lomé Convention, because we had 
breached the agreement. So we had a kind of CMAG-arrangement, too; 
because under Article 96, at the time, we had to go and tell our story and to 
justify what we are doing so that the sanctions under the Lomé Convention 
could be lifted. 
 
So, I had sessions with CMAG. I had sessions with the Article 96 Committee 
in Brussels and, of course, with the UN. When you are in front of the General 
Assembly, you’ve got to explain it in the way it is unfolding in the country; you 
can’t go out there and tell lies. The whole world is watching you. 
 
SO:  Sir, how much was foreign affairs an important domestic issue here in 
Fiji? 
 
KT:  Domestically, obviously, there’s an interest in what Fiji is doing under the 
Lomé Convention and under the Commonwealth. I explained that in Cabinet, 
for instance, and sometimes it came up in parliament. So, it was something 
that people wished to know: the various policies we have, as against our 
friends abroad. But if you go down the street and then talk about foreign 
policies, they wouldn’t even understand it. So, when I say there is interest, it 
was in the institutions: in Cabinet, obviously; in Parliament, some questions 
do come up, which the Minister of Foreign Affairs has to answer. So, at that 
level: at the institutional level. 
 
SO:  What about the relationship with China? I know that this was part of 
your particular strategy when you were Foreign Minister – to improve 
bilateral relations with the PRC, to improve trade and to improve 
investment. How problematic was this? 
 
KT:  By the time I got into parliament, there was already a declaration of the ‘Look 
North’ Policy. The ‘Look North’ Policy started after the coup of 1987 and it 
was coined during that time. When I got into Cabinet in 2000, it was there and 
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we just put a lot of focus on it. We enlarged the concept, and I recall saying 
publicly that the ‘Look North’ Policy is not so much a break away from 
Australia and New Zealand: I referred to it as a diversification of our foreign 
policies. It may say, ‘Look North’, but it is, ‘Look North, Look East, and Look 
West.’ So we were open to new alignments and new partnerships. 
 
SO:  Exploiting the compass… 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  …rather than emphasising one particular axis? 
 
KT:  That’s right. People were referring to ‘Look North’ as just China, but I had to 
clarify on a few occasions that ‘Look North’ is a diversification of our own 
foreign policies. We may be looking away from Australia and New Zealand, 
because of what has happened, but we are open to creating new 
partnerships, new alignments and all that. So, while China was very much 
prominent and very visible, we were looking at other alignments and other 
partnerships. 
 
SO:  Was this primarily in the trade and educational sectors, or were you also 
thinking of it in a security dimension? 
 
KT:  The ‘Look North’ policy was very much driven by an economic desire on our 
part: to find new markets, to find new sources of ODA, technical assistance 
and all that. I think geopolitics really didn’t feature prominently at the time. 
 
SO:  Even after 9/11, there wasn’t a new political interest from Washington? 
 
KT:  Well, it did increase in terms of its status and importance and, especially, with 
interest from America, from the USA, because the USA used to be strong in 
the region. It had a cooling off session, it disappeared, and then with China 
coming in, it came back. So, with China coming in, and America trying to 
reassert itself, that’s when the geopolitics became more prominent. 
 
SO:  Sir, when did you have a realisation of this geopolitical contestation, 
here in the mid-Pacific? 
 
KT:  I think it was the reference to the Cold War, when the US had a strong focus 
on the Pacific. After the Cold War, it receded, and there was a vacuum that 
was created. I talked about that when I was Minister at the time. I was critical 
of the US taking a back seat view of the Pacific, and I did say that they were 
creating a vacuum. I think the vacuum was created and then China increased 
its presence. It was only after America was really trying to reassert itself that 
the geopolitical aspects of it became more prominent in our thinking; and 
then, of course, the China/Taiwan issue, because we were trying to be friends 
to both. We had the One China policy, but we wanted to relate to Taiwan at 
the commercial level, and we did that very well. We’ve got the presence of the 
two countries here in Fiji. We observe the One China policy and with Taiwan 
we created a commercial relationship, which worked well. 
 
SO:  I know this caused you problems, as Foreign Minister, with a particular 
group within Cabinet who wished to have more formal representation 
and involvement with Taiwan. Did that then complicate the relationship 
with Beijing? 
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KT:  Yes. It became complicated somewhat, but we were firm in our stance at the 
time. We believed in the One China policy, and I think, at the time, in the UN 
as well, that was becoming almost a stance for the UN – to observe the One 
China policy – which we took up and [went] with that… But we were open to 
having a commercial relationship with Taiwan. We had a problem with Ratu 
Mara, who had about nine visits to Taiwan, because he was friendly with the 
leaders of Taiwan. And, so, there was some sensitivity there. But, from the 
government’s standpoint, One China policy was the way to go; and with 
Taiwan, it was a commercial relationship. 
 
SO:  I have a note saying that you had to deal with some elements within 
your own government who promoted relations with Taiwan. 
 
KT:  Ratu Mara was the one, as President. Even at the time, he was still visiting 
Taiwan. He had about nine visits to Taiwan, at leaders’ level. 
 
SO:  Did he also have some supporters within the Cabinet or within your 
political party on this issue? 
 
KT:  There were one or two discussions. One on the China/Taiwan relationship 
and our stance towards that. But we were firm: One China policy. We were 
not anti-Taiwan. Taiwan was even present here in Fiji, but the relationship is 
one of commercial relations. 
 
SO: I know that your Minister of Health, Solome Naivalu, defied your 
instructions by voting in favour of Observer Status for Taiwan at the 
World Health Assembly. 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  How did you deal with that one? 
 
KT:  Well, I was not happy! [Laughter] 
 
SO:  I bet you weren’t happy! [Laughter] It’s probably an under-statement. 
 
KT:  Yeah. Well, I think there would be some kind of recording of the way that we 
felt at the Ministry, at the time. I did say publicly my view against that one. 
 
SO:  [Laughter] I’m sure some sparks flew behind the scenes. 
 
KT:  Well, I made the statement and there was no follow-up. So we left it at that. 
[Laughter] 
 
SO:  Sir, there were, of course, more events in 2006. 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  Please could you describe how this affected you politically? How did 
the 2006 events effect Fiji’s foreign relations? 
 
KT:  In 2006… I was a Minister at that time, but not in parliament. I was in the 
Senate. I didn’t stand for the 2005 elections and I had announced my 
retirement. That’s when my friend sent me a book called ‘Retirement’s a 
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Myth’, and the Ministry people at the time gave me a fishing rod to go fishing. 
[Laughter] 
 
SO:  Wonderful. Now, is this a fly fishing rod? 
 
KT:  A casting rod. So, I am now a fisherman! But PM Qarase asked me to come 
back to Cabinet through the Senate, and I talked about it with my wife and we 
decided, “Okay, we’ll go.” And so I was in Cabinet in 2006, as a Senator, and 
then we had the 2006 coup on 5-6 December. 
 
SO:  Did that come out of the blue for you again? 
 
KT:  No, I think it was taking a long time to develop, and there were a lot of 
discussions with Bainimarama at the time. We were concerned about what 
was happening. There were some discussions to offer him a diplomatic 
posting – which we did, and he had initially agreed. But then, after taking 
some other advice, he turned it down. So, to us, that was the indication that 
he was firm in what he was trying to do. It all happened on 5 December. 
 
SO:  So was there a key, core group – surrounding the Prime Minister – who 
were in negotiations with Bainimarama to try to forestall another coup? 
 
KT:  Well, there is the Security Council in Cabinet, and I sat on that Security 
Council and we were very much aware of what was going on. But we were 
also aware of the advice that was coming from the Minister of Defence at the 
time. He was basically saying, “Don’t worry. It’s not going to happen.” But it 
did happen – yes, and the signs were there, I suppose – on 5 December. 
 
SO:  Sir, obviously, you had this looming storm, as you say. You were aware 
of it in the Security Council and were discussing how to prevent it, 
based on intelligence from the key minister? 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  Were you also trying to draw on external support and contacts to try to 
prevent this from happening? Or were you trying to deal with this 
entirely within Fiji as a domestic issue? Were you attempting to 
cauterize it internally? 
 
KT:  Well, yes. I think it was all domestic. We were trying to resolve [it], and that’s 
why we decided to send him [Bainimarama] as an Ambassador. He had 
asked. We gave it to him and then he turned it down. 
 
SO:  So you didn’t contemplate, within the Security Council, the possibility of 
drawing on, say, the good offices of the Secretary General of the 
Commonwealth or anyone within the Pacific Islands Forum to mediate, 
or have a below-the-radar chat? 
 
KT:  We were comforted by the advice from the Minister at the time. He was in the 
Cabinet and he was saying, “There’s no support within the military.” So we 
relied on advice. 
 
SO:  Sir, immediately after 5 December, the Commonwealth Ministerial Action 
Group suspended Fiji from the councils of the Commonwealth, with 
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immediate effect, on 8 December 2006. Did Don McKinnon call you 
straight away? How was this message communicated? 
 
KT:  Well, at the time, there was the new government. Frank [Bainimarama] was in 
place. We were totally out of office at the time. He came in and just took over 
the government. At the time I couldn’t even go back to my office to collect my 
things. 
 
SO:  What time of day did this happen? 
 
KT:  This was in the afternoon. We were sitting in the Prime Minister’s residence at 
the time having some kava. The military came in to stop us from leaving, 
surrounded the house, and they took over the machinery of government on 5 
December. And so, after a while, we all went home. We were allowed to go 
home but the Prime Minister, Laisenia Qarase, was under house arrest and 
he couldn’t leave. And so the rest of us had to leave, and that was it. I didn’t 
get back to my office.  It was my PA who packed up some of the things that I 
needed and brought them home. And that was that. I never went back to the 
office. 
 
SO:  So, the Senate was immediately suspended? 
 
KT:  Yes. It was a coup, it was a dictatorship, and they declared themselves as the 
government. It was only later – when it was a judgment of the Court – that it 
was unconstitutional. And it was after that that Frank Bainimarama abrogated 
the constitution and stayed on up until now. 
 
SO:  I spoke to Mr Sitiveni Rabuka yesterday and he made a distinction 
between the events of 1987, which he said was not a military coup… 
 
KT:  Well, then what was it? [Laughter] 
 
SO:   …and the events of 2006. Would you agree with that distinction? 
 
KT:  A coup is a coup, whoever does it. It is unconstitutional. 
 
SO:  Indeed. Sir, in relation to my earlier question about China and the United 
States, and also this question of ‘coups, many coups’, how far do you 
feel that the geopolitical engagement of China and the US here in Fiji 
and the alternative sources of overseas direct investment have helped 
to slow down democratisation and a return to democracy here in Fiji?  
 
KT:  I don’t think the China/US aspect of Fiji’s relations with these foreign 
governments had any impact on the pace of our democratisation. I think it 
was all internally driven. As I was saying, the dictatorship came into 
existence. The Court, some years later, made the judgment that it was 
unconstitutional, and at that point in time, Frank Bainimarama abrogated the 
constitution. He put in place a five-year road map and then implemented it. In 
2009, there was a lot of pressure to have elections, but he was firm in what 
he wanted to do: he abrogated the constitution, [said] that he needed five 
years to do what he wanted to do to clean up the country, to clean the various 
institutions. As he said, it was all corrupt and we were all corrupted and would 
have to be cleaned out, and that would take five years before the next 
General Election. So, I think it was internally driven. 
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SO:  I have a note here that the Pacific Islands Forum threatened to suspend 
Fiji in August 2008 if Bainimarama didn’t commit to holding a General 
Election by March 2009. And then the Special Leaders’ meeting at the 
PIF – held in Papua New Guinea – set a deadline, which he rejected. 
 
KT:  Yes, because, when he abrogated the Constitution, he was the authority. And 
he said he needed five years to do what he wanted to do. He wanted to clean 
the country of corruption. He wanted to remove poverty. He had lots of things 
he wanted to do! Whether he has done it, I don’t know. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  That’s why he argues he needs more time? I’m aware Bainimarama is 
setting up his Fiji First Party…. 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  Sir, were you involved in any private contacts with people trying to use 
your good offices? …Because of your extensive international 
experience, your connections in the region with Australia, with New 
Zealand, and with the Commonwealth. Were there those who were 
approaching you to see if it was possible to lend any weight to the 
argument about returning to democracy? I appreciate that it was a 
dictatorship, but that doesn’t mean that there were not private probes. 
 
KT:  Yes. I’ve been involved, in one way or another, in trying to make sure that 
Frank Bainimarama stays with this road map. Once he made the statement 
that he needed five years and he put a deadline to it, I think, for most of us, 
we had to accept that. And we just had to make sure that everything is in 
place to allow the return to democracy. For instance, I was approached…and 
I am a member of a think tank looking at foreign policy under Ratu Inoke 
Kubuabola, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, and our task there is, 
basically, to make sure that we do return to democracy. That’s what we’ve 
been doing in the Foreign Affairs task force. 
 
SO:  When was the task force appointed? 
 
KT:  It would have been three years ago. 
 
SO:  So does this involve consulting foreign or regional opinion, in political 
and commercial terms? 
 
KT:  It is a think tank. It’s a bouncing board; Ratu Inoke would bring some issues in 
there and we talk it over and ensure that they match the drive to return to 
democracy. 
 
SO:  Sir, this is obviously a Fiji initiative, a Fiji forum. But this think tank is 
drawing on a wide wealth of knowledge. I’m interested that the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs is doing this when surely they would have expertise 
‘in-house’? 
 
KT:  Yes, it’s an initiative of the Minister. I’m a member with some of the current 
diplomats and some academics. Basically, we are not giving advice directly 
but the Minister makes use of the discussions there to craft his own view on 
things. 
 
SO:  Is this a public task force? 
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KT:  A private task force. 
 
SO:  For a task force to be effective, it has to be relatively small. 
 
KT:  Yes. There are about five or six of us. 
 
SO:  So, in that case, you act, as you say, as an important, separate 
sounding board of wider opinion within Fiji. Has recruitment been a 
problem for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs here in Fiji? If Fiji has had a 
particular style of government, has this eroded intellectual input within 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? 
 
KT:  A lot of people didn’t leave the Ministry. The ambassadors who are still there 
and who were there before stayed in the Ministry and so ensured that there is 
some continuity in the policy-making and in the views. There are some very 
powerful diplomats in there. There’s Isikeli Mataitoga, now the Ambassador in 
Japan, who is also a member of our task force and [who] has got strong views 
on our foreign policies, and so the Minister has benefited from that. So, whilst 
a person like Isikeli Mataitoga – with his views on the need to return to 
democracy eventually… and, in the process of doing that, we can also take 
the opportunity to widen our net, to expand the ‘Look North’ policy, and that is 
exactly what is happening. The ‘Look North’ policy has been extended to 
include Russia and Turkey and all the new friends that have come on board; 
but, at the same time, [it has been] expanding the role of Fiji. You know, Fiji is 
the chair of the Group of 77 and a few other UN agencies like that. It is all part 
of the advice from people like Mataitoga: “Yes, yes, we can actually go back 
to democratisation, because we all want to have that. In the meantime, whilst 
we are outside here, we need friends, so we have to work hard to get friends.” 
Fiji has been very active in the UN and the Group of 77. It’s all part of the 
diversification of our foreign policy. 
 
SO:  Sir, would you say that there is a consensus view in the task force about 
Fiji’s future relationship with the Commonwealth?  
 
KT:  I think the task force only wishes to regularize the situation and our 
membership. 
 
SO:  How much importance is attached to the Commonwealth? 
 
KT:  On the Commonwealth… I think we have sentimental values, which is 
important. The Commonwealth was involved in many excellent areas of 
cooperation. I remember the Commonwealth of Learning, with its distant 
learning, the engagement with the local government administration, women, 
gender – these are very important sectors and issues for development in the 
Pacific. So, the Commonwealth has been involved with that and I think the 
criticism here is [with regard to] what the benefits of Commonwealth 
engagement are. The Commonwealth is long on ideas, but very short in terms 
of resources to back up those ideas. 
 
SO:  Indeed. 
 
KT:  I think that is part of the problem. I think there’s still a youth office here in the 
Pacific. That’s good. Excellent issues and sectors of engagement, but they 
are not backed up with resources. 
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SO:  I have a note here saying that the Commonwealth Fund of Technical 
Cooperation (CFTC) aid budget is something like £29 million [£29.7m in 
financial year 2012-2013] at the moment. It’s tiny. 
 
KT:  Yes, that is the problem with the group. Great ideas – you know, we want 
ideas, and they do bring ideas. But back it up with resources! 
 
SO:  Okay, so if you are going to be an intellectual think tank – as the 
Commonwealth was under Sonny Ramphal’s leadership – you need to 
have money to back those ideas up. 
 
KT:  I think it is money, yes. You have to have back up for ideas. Find financiers 
who will back up ideas. Maybe that’s the approach for the future. The ideas 
are there: just get a financial backer. 
 
SO:  I’m also going to suggest that, if Fiji is looking for bilateral aid, the 
connection with China might seem particularly attractive – because of 
its lack of conditionalities, the relative speed of decision-making, the 
lack of prescriptive clauses that are associated with the major 
international financial institutions … 
 
KT:  Well, that relates mainly to China, for instance, and Russia. With the New 
Zealand Aid and AusAid, they’ve got programmes which are multiannual and 
multi-sectoral and I think that is probably the direction the ODA is taking.  
 
SO:  What you’re outlining here is, actually, that the Commonwealth has 
diversified into regionalism: if you’re talking about the Pacific Islands 
Forum, or the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), as well… 
 
KT:  Yes. There is a reconfiguration. I’ve used that term in the Pacific, but I think it 
is all part of the changes that are necessary and that we have to manage, 
because it comes down to what our members want. The configuration is 
taking place, but we have just got the Pacific Plan reviewed. There is a review 
report that has been out – a very good report – which is taking the Pacific 
regionalism back to basics: what we wanted to do way back in 2002-03. 
We’ve lost our way a little bit, but now the report is taking us back to regional 
integration and all that. And so this reconfiguration is, I think, good in the long 
term. We needed that, and regionalism is the way to go for the Pacific. The 
review of the Pacific Plan is taking us in the right direction. In the meantime, 
the growth of sub-regionalism – the MSG – is getting stronger and stronger. It 
has, for instance, the only trade agreement in the Pacific that works: the MSG 
Trade Agreement. The Pacific Islands Countries’ Trade Agreement (PICTA) is 
not working well. It has not been ratified by all the members, for instance, and 
it’s the MSG that is developing as a strong sub-regional organisation. It’s not 
going to compete with the Forum. The Forum is over-arching and MSG is a 
sub-regional organisation within Pacific regionalism. 
 
SO:  So, it’s an inter-governmental organisation with a Secretariat? 
 
KT:  Well, yes. But the membership of the MSG includes a political party, the 
FLNKS. 
 
SO:  From New Caledonia? 
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KT:  Yes. It’s a government-in-waiting, maybe. Out of the Nouméa Accord. So, the 
MSG is an inter-governmental body, ‘plus’. 
 
SO:  How far are the political economies of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu, as well as the government-in-waiting in New 
Caledonia, complementary? Do they form a regional political or 
economic grouping? 
 
KT:  They are all part of Melanesia, technically, and that unites the group. The 
origin of the group was a political alliance that supported the FLNKS; that’s 
how it originated. It was a political alliance. It has become now a sub-regional 
group that’s looking after regional and sub-regional integration and all that. It 
has a trade agreement, for instance, so it is becoming a sub-regional 
economic community of sorts. 
 
SO:  Does the MSG have a particular relationship to the PRC? 
 
KT:  No, the relationship is at the bilateral level. So, the MSG is just a sub-regional 
organisation that wants to play its part in the Pacific: as a sub-regional body 
within Pacific regionalism. 
 
SO:  So how much authority and autonomy does the Director have? Does he 
speak for the MSG… 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  …at the Pacific Islands Forum? I was just wondering what his area of 
responsibility is, if he has a small Secretariat? 
 
KT:  Well, he has the authorities of a Secretary General. And part of his terms of 
reference is to speak for the group in between sessions, for instance. 
 
SO:  Yes. 
 
KT:  So, a fully-fledged, sub-regional organisation, with suitable authorities for its 
head, the Secretary General. 
 
SO:  Okay. Does the Secretary General have any particular relationship with 
the Commonwealth Secretariat in London? I am just looking at all the 
members: Fiji, a currently suspended Commonwealth member; Papua 
New Guinea, current; the Solomon Islands, current; Vanuatu… 
 
KT:  Yes, we do get assistance. The MSG gets technical assistance from the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. So, it is just like any inter-governmental body in 
its relationship with the Commonwealth.   
 
SO:  Okay. So, has this been another way for Fiji to maintain its relationship 
with the Commonwealth, or is this just coincidental? 
 
KT:  Yes. It is not so much a way back to the Commonwealth, but it is happy to be 
still in that group and benefiting indirectly from the Commonwealth. The MSG 
is really a sub-regional initiative in the Pacific, because this is all part of the 
reconfiguration that is going on: the formation of sub-regional bodies. And, 
already, there is a sub-regional organisation called the Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) that has been in existence for many, many years. 
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They have been receiving a lot of assistance from the Forum, but it is a sub-
regional organisation which is recognised. Every year, the leaders have a 
summit of small island states that reports to the main Forum Leaders’ 
Summit. MSG is another sub-regional organisation. The Polynesians have 
also formed a sub-regional body and Samoa is running the Secretariat for 
that, and the Micronesians have also formed their own regional sub-group. 
So, the view that we take is that the sub-regional bodies are good, because it 
is an opportunity to address some of the issues more intimately than you 
would get at a regional level. 
 
SO:  Sir, could I suggest, though, that the Commonwealth – with its particular 
focus in the early 1980s on the security of small states and the 
publication of its 1983 Report [Vulnerability: Small States in the Global 
Society] – likes to put itself forward as a spokesperson for small states? 
Indeed, since 1983, the majority of the members of this organisation are 
small states. And yet, here, you are emphasizing different institutional 
sub-regional focus and linkages? 
 
KT:  That can link to the Commonwealth? Yes, I think the Commonwealth small 
states initiative is great. And I was part of the delegation of ministers from the 
Commonwealth small states, promoting small states’ interests in the WTO at 
the time. So, it’s a great initiative of the Commonwealth: the focus on small 
states and the development problems faced by the small states within the 
WTO, the discussions on the Doha Round, the interests of the small states 
within the Doha negotiations... So, that’s a great initiative. 
 
SO:  But, Sir, when you formed part of that delegation – that roving interest 
group – was this a specific Commonwealth initiative? 
 
KT:  Yes. It came from the Abuja discussions in 2003, following the collapse of the 
Doha discussions at Cancun in September 2001. The Commonwealth heads 
issued the Aso Rock Statement on Multilateral Trade at the Abuja meeting. It 
was after that conference that a small group of Ministers was put together to 
go round and visit some of the capitals around the world. I was part of that. 
 
SO:  So this was Don McKinnon’s initiative? 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  Okay. Who else was involved in this Commonwealth Trade Ministers 
Mission? 
 
KT: The Deputy Prime Minister of Barbados, Dame Billie Miller, who was also 
Head of the Caribbean Region Negotiations on Doha Round and the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Barbados. The Mission Chair was Alhaji Idris 
Waziri, Minister of Commerce in Nigeria;  
 
SO:  So you were a group of Commonwealth Trade Ministers that were going 
around, specifically lobbying or courting opinion? Or to educate other 
key members on the particular needs of small states? 
 
KT:  To educate, and to lobby for the position of the small island states, or small 
states in the WTO. 
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SO:  So how much did the Secretariat provide the administrative back up for 
you? In terms of support for the report that you would have been 
required to write… 
   
KT:  We were well received. There was a report that would have gone to the 
Secretariat. 
 
SO:  Did it have any impact? 
 
KT:  At the WTO? [Laughter] Those negotiators are probably going to die there! 
The Doha Round has struggled to conclude. 
 
SO:  Well, as Henry Kissinger said, “It’s all very well having a policy initiative. 
What’s the impact?” 
 
KT:  Yes, but it’s difficult to change the WTO. You can see what happened at that 
meeting in Bali. And they’re still talking about the Doha Round! I have lost 
track of what is happening at the WTO. 
 
SO:  Obviously, you felt that there was benefit to this idea – to have a quartet 
of leading and experienced politicians and diplomats from the small 
island states. But did you think there could be a Commonwealth bloc 
that could be going forward in the WTO? Or, in fact, were there too 
many competing agendas here? 
 
KT:  The Commonwealth bloc really didn’t materialise in the WTO. There were too 
many other blocs there. There was the Group of 90, the Group of 110. There 
were too many groups and so the Commonwealth played its role by focusing 
on the small island states, the small island vulnerable economies, which is 
recognised under the WTO as a group of concerned countries. 
 
SO:  So, you feel that the Commonwealth, in fact, had some input into the 
WTO recognition? That they were a specific group that had unique 
interests and needs for their political economies? 
 
KT:  Oh yes. Yes, and the Commonwealth did a lot of things, not only financing the 
Group that went round. They had seminars and they had group discussions 
on how to negotiate as a small island state. So, a lot of work was done by the 
Commonwealth and that’s a very useful input. 
 
SO:  On how to negotiate as a small island state? 
 
KT:  Yes, trade agreements. 
 
SO:  In what way? 
 
KT:  Just the art of negotiating and then strengthening your group, your outlook, 
and this kind of thing. 
 
SO:  Oh, did that include anything revelatory or new to you, as an 
experienced diplomat? 
 
KT:  Well, it was an endorsement of what we had been trying to do all the time, but 
to me it was just great that the Commonwealth was focusing on these issues 
on how to negotiate. People would come to the group with wide experience 
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on how to negotiate, and they had people who were coming there for the first 
time and not knowing what to do in negotiations. So, I thought that input was 
very useful. 
 
SO:  I’m fascinated by this guidance on how to build a negotiating team. This 
is capacity building? 
 
KT:  It is capacity building. It is learning, because the WTO and all its concepts 
and conventions… they are not easy. You have got to be there for several 
years to understand all the different groups and what is going on. The 
institutions – such as the Green Room and all those groups – can be quite 
complex and confusing. 
 
SO:  Was that unique to the WTO negotiating environment? Or could you use 
the knowledge and techniques from other settings? For example, would 
there be a crossover from the culture and negotiating approach of the 
UN to the WTO, or, in fact, are they too radically different? 
 
KT:  Probably different in many ways, and the WTO has its own traditions and 
systems where you negotiate as a group, then you break away and create 
your own positions, which you then bring to the plenary. And, once the 
negotiations have advanced to some extent, they then create a Green Room 
where you attend by invitation. You are invited to come in and try to reach a 
common position. If you are not part of the group, you are not invited; you are 
not part of the Green Room. So, there is some discrimination there. 
 
SO:  My goodness, it sounds incredibly arcane! But also very hierarchical? 
 
KT:  It’s very hierarchical, because of the differing role of the varying members in 
global trade. The small island states, small vulnerable economies, make up 
0.1% of the global trading system. 
 
SO:  So, not a lot of leverage? 
 
KT:  Very little leverage. So, yes, it’s very hierarchical, and we believe that the 
rules are weighed against the small traders. 
 
SO:  So, the pressure is for economic liberalisation from much larger 
economies or economic units, such as the EU or the United States 
economy, both with their protectionist barriers? 
 
KT:  Well, on liberalisation… We go to the WTO and talk about removing barriers 
and liberalizing, removing subsidies? Look at the United States with its 
agricultural subsidies, the CAP with its agricultural policy, and China and 
Japan are carrying on with their subsidies. And yet subsidies are banned 
under the WTO. It only works for some, and not for others! 
 
SO:  Well, indeed! I remember reading about Thatcher arguing with President 
Mitterrand saying, “Look, the EU is so protectionist.” And he said, “Yes, 
that’s the point.” [Laughter] 
 
KT:  Yeah, so it is the big boys that rule there. We love to say that the WTO is a 
member-driven organisation. Yes, member-driven, but only the big boys are 
driving it.   
 
23 
 
SO:  You feel, though, that that was a particular Commonwealth-supported 
initiative to enable small states’ diplomacy – in terms of training, 
facilitation or to give a greater platform to lobby for your interests – 
even if, as you say, small states’ trade only comprised 0.1%? 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  You made reference to the Commonwealth of Learning and also the 
Commonwealth Local Government Association initiative. This all 
indicates that the Commonwealth has evolved dramatically since the 
inter-governmental emphasis of the early days, and that its role is now 
in different avenues and fora. Are Commonwealth civil society 
organisations still operating here in Fiji, below the government-level 
radar?  
 
KT:  Yes, there is an office here of the Commonwealth Local Government 
organisation. 
 
SO:  Yes. So, providing training, providing knowledge transfers on local 
government administration and practice? 
 
KT:  Yes, I don’t quite know the details of what they do, but there is an office which 
is active here; and yet, in Fiji, because of the situation we are in, there’s no 
elected local governance. There are no town councils. There are only town 
administrators appointed by the government. So, that’s a thing we will have to 
reorganise. Once we get back – and we have to get back – to electing our 
own councils. At the moment, there are no local councils. 
 
SO:  It’s individually appointed officials from the central government? 
 
KT:  Yes. ‘Special Administrators’, they are called. 
 
SO:  So, Special Administrators appoint their own officials, their own 
budgetary organisation? 
 
KT:  Yeah. 
 
SO:  So you have to build, as you say, really from the grass roots then? 
 
KT:  Yes. We have to get back to democratising local government, in the same 
way we are trying to do at the national level. 
 
SO:  This is since 2006? 
 
KT:  Yeah, after 2006. 
 
SO:  So, how much – in this eight year interim period, then – has there been 
an important leaching of knowledge at local government level? 
 
KT:  It’s my view that we have had this existence for eight years, and it does 
create an urge to get back and to do what is necessary to democratise. It is 
capacity building again, maybe. And just to go back to normal. 
 
SO:  So that implies then, at the capacity building level, the Commonwealth 
would indeed have a… 
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KT:  Have a role. 
 
SO:  …have an important role at local Government level. In terms of health, 
education delivery, sanitation, refuse collection… 
 
KT:  A very important role. Yes. 
 
SO:  …possibly, also budgetary accounting systems…? 
 
KT:  Yes. Those units would still be there. Their role has been somewhat 
downplayed, I think, but you still need to do some capacity building… of 
course, apart from democratising the whole system. 
 
SO:  How confident are you of these approaching elections, due in 
September? 
 
KT:  Well, I am a keen observer. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  You are a very experienced observer, Sir, which is why I am asking you. 
 
KT:  Frank Bainimarama and the regime have said sufficiently [enough] for people 
to believe that these General Elections will happen, and so, I think they are 
committed to that. It’s the logistics. We’ve got a new constitution, which was 
not driven by the people. It was handed down: top down. And we have a 
changed electoral system. We have one constituency, so the whole country is 
one constituency. 
 
SO:  So, will the general election be on a party list system? 
 
KT:  Well, this is coming out: how the electoral system is going to work at the 
practical level. The party list system, there has been talk. I haven’t seen the 
new electoral decree, but that just came out last week and it is being studied 
now: how this is going to pan out. So, it is going to be a smaller parliament 
with 50 seats, one constituency… 
 
SO:  Yes, a unicameral national assembly, with no Senate. 
 
KT:  …no Senate. And this is the new system that we have. Voting is not 
compulsory. They want to do the elections in one day, have it counted that 
same night, and this is what they are trying to do. 
 
SO:  So you have a newly appointed Electoral Commissioner, issues of voter 
education, voter registration… 
 
KT:  Yes. The voter registration is complete. 
 
SO:   And that is based on a current census? 
 
KT:  Yes. It has been an ongoing process and they’ve gone overseas to register 
those who are interested. So, we have electoral rolls… 
 
SO:  But I saw in yesterday’s paper that it is going to be a question of each 
candidate being assigned a number, and the voters are expected to vote 
for the number on their ballot? 
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KT:  That is what is emerging now from the new Electoral Decree: that is providing 
details of how it’s going to work, that’s what I’ve heard. The person you are 
going to vote for… You have one tick, it has a number, so you look at the list 
outside of the ballot box… 
 
SO:  With an image of the candidate.  
 
KT:  Yes, and then you go into the ballot box to tick that number, so you may have 
the wrong number by the time you get there. You know, “What is the 
number?” 
 
SO:  Because you are not allowed to take any paper, or anything, in with 
you? 
 
KT:  No, you can’t write anything on your hand. So, this is the big unknown. 
 
SO:  Do you have any idea of the thinking behind allocating a number, rather 
than a name or a Party? 
 
KT:  Well, they have people that have been across to other countries. For 
example, the people were sent to Australia to be observers there. All these 
ideas are new. 
 
SO:  Yes, they are. 
 
KT:  All these ideas are new; so I think the elections will take place. It will probably 
be too messy, because we are trying to implement a new system completely, 
and it is complicated. 
 
SO:  It is. Is there any degree of proportional representation? 
 
KT:  That, again… I haven’t seen the electoral system, but it’s been talked about. 
 
SO:  This is awfully fast. Here we are in April, and the elections are in 
September. 
 
KT:  Yes. The electoral decree has just come out and all the various political 
parties are looking at the decree and seeing how it is all going to pan out. 
Some discussions are emerging right now. The logistics: just imagine… The 
320 islands, and the villages in the interior, and the islands, and we have to 
do all that in one day. And they are talking about centralising all the ballot 
boxes to count that same night. I don’t know. 
 
SO:  A very tall order. 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  Sir, in the new constitution it states the independence of the judiciary, 
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press… 
 
KT:  Yes. 
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SO:  …so the democratic forms and norms that are required under the Harare 
Declaration, the Millbrook Declaration and the Latimer House Principles 
of the Commonwealth are all there? 
 
KT:  Yes. And there are a lot more rights that have been highlighted. You know, 
the rights to housing, etc. 
 
SO:  Are indigenous rights embedded in the Constitution? 
 
KT:  There are aspects of the indigenous rights reflected: land ownership, for 
instance. But there is a big question on land ownership: whether [or not] the 
protection has been weakened under the new Constitution. A lot of people do 
think that the protection that used to be there in previous constitutions has 
gone, or has been diluted. So, what will happen now? On land ownership, if 
there are any issues regarding land, it will be taken to parliament and the 
parliament will make the decision. In the previous constitution, the matter of 
land – relating to the indigenous rights – was put to the Senate, and the 
Senate would make a determination on it. And the Senate would always 
favour the indigenous people. So, that’s all gone. 
 
SO:  Sir, is there an issue of ‘land hunger’ in this country? I am aware I’m 
using an African expression in a Pacific context, but do you understand 
the…? 
 
KT:  Yes. Not so much ‘hunger’. I think the issue in Fiji is somewhat different. You 
know, you’ve got landowners and you’ve got the tenants’ communities: The 
indigenous Fijians are the land owners; the tenant communities, and others, 
are mainly the Indian-descent Fijians. 
 
SO:  Yeah, so it’s a freehold/leasehold issue? 
 
KT:  Well, there’s leasehold, there’s freehold, and there’s government-owned land. 
So, those categories are still there and the ownership and the tenancy are 
very much divided on a racial line, and that has always created sensitivities in 
land issues in the past. So, the concern, really, is making land available for 
those who need it, and [ensuring] a fair return to the landowners. I think those 
are the two main concerns. The hunger? Not so much the hunger, because 
people do lease and a lot of the cane farmers are leaseholders. The problem 
of leasing comes up, at times, when the politics get too hot, some politicians 
would come up [to the landowners] and say, “Don’t lease your land to the 
Indians.” And that’s when we have problems. But if you don’t lease your land, 
you don’t get a return on your assets. So, it is better utilisation of land which, I 
think, is the concern; and to have it available for those who need it, to 
develop, to increase the economic growth of the country. 
 
SO:  What about the social aspects of informal settlement and urbanisation? 
If you have rural/urban migration and limited access to land, it also has 
implications in social policy areas. 
 
KT:  Well, there is the problem with the squatters. The squatters go to the 
landowners and the landowners would accept a bottle of whiskey, or 
something like that: “Yeah, you can build there.” 
 
SO:  Is that how that works? 
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KT:  But there is no formalisation of that community. There is no lease. But they 
get the land, they build their house and the services come in – the water, the 
electricity – servicing this house on a squatter settlement, for instance. And it 
becomes difficult, because all the amenities are being supplied and the 
landowner has given his okay and more people and huts are sprouting up… 
 
SO:  Sir, these are shared issues across the Pacific. 
 
KT:  The squatter is a problem in other countries. In Papua New Guinea, it is a 
problem; in Fiji, it is a problem. I think in Micronesia [too]. In Polynesia it is not 
so bad…the squatter settlements are a problem. 
 
SO:  Do you think the Commonwealth – in terms of knowledge transfers or 
practical capacity support, issues of how to deal with land… Do you 
think the Commonwealth, because of shared challenges of access to 
land, has anything to offer? Squatter issues in the Pacific are very 
similar to informal settlements and social vulnerability in African 
countries. I’m just thinking, I suppose, of a possible wider think tank 
role. 
 
KT:  Well, they have a presence here already in the Local Government setup…and 
I would see an increased role of the Commonwealth going through that entity: 
to look at land settlement, urbanisation, squatter settlements. I would see a 
role for the Commonwealth there. 
 
SO:  Sir, can I just ask you, as a last question, how much do you think the 
Commonwealth has survived because of Her Majesty, the Queen? And 
what does this say for the Commonwealth going forward? 
 
KT:  It’s a special club, the Commonwealth. A special club, with a special head. 
You don’t get that anywhere in the world. So, I think, its existence and its 
longevity has contributed to this fact. 
 
SO:  It’s a club with rules though? 
 
KT:  There are rules. Well, every club has to have rules. 
 
SO:  Indeed. Although some would say that, when they joined the 
Commonwealth, it didn’t have rules, and now this club has rules: this is 
not what they originally joined or signed up for. 
 
KT:  Well, because it’s grown. 
 
SO:  Is it too big? 
 
KT:  53…The ACP is 81. No, it is not too big. 
 
SO:  When you’ve gone to Commonwealth meetings, though, have you 
remarked particularly on its informality, the benefit of contact with 
larger states and their leaders? 
 
KT:  Yes, it has its value in networking and knowing, putting a face to the person, 
and I think that has a value. I’m not the head of a Commonwealth 
government, but I have attended a number of Heads of Government 
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meetings, and I am just one of them. I mix around with them. I’ve lined up for 
the Queen with them. 
 
SO:  But was the table physically too big to involve everybody in the 
discussion? 
 
KT:  No. I managed to make points, and that is the worth of the smaller groups. 
With the Pacific Group there, they probably take a group position. Small 
island states have a little group, so… 
 
SO:  Did your Prime Minister ask you to come with him to the Retreat when 
you went to the Abuja and Cyprus meetings? 
 
KT:  I attended those Heads of Government meetings, because my Prime Minister 
was not available at the time. 
 
SO:  Oh, so you went to the Retreat? 
 
KT:  I went as a representative of the Prime Minister. 
 
SO:  How did you find the Retreat? 
 
KT:  The Retreat? Was there a Retreat? [Laughter] Yes. In the Forum, we have a 
Retreat, right? 
 
SO:  Yes. So you copied that from the Commonwealth?   
 
KT:  Yes, I suppose so, yes. When we go to the Leaders’ meeting here, Leaders 
go off for their Retreat. It has become a more informal gathering. 
 
SO:  Including ‘golf diplomacy’? 
 
KT:  Yes, so it is the same thing there. You remove your tie, you remove the 
formality… and they just sit next to each other and talk. 
 
SO:  About what really concerns them, yes? 
 
KT:  Yes, yes. 
 
SO:  Sir, did you find that beneficial? 
 
KT:  For me? I was going and standing in for the Prime Minister. I felt as part of the 
group, yes… 
 
SO:  It has been said that there has been an undertow of resentment among 
Pacific island states that the Commonwealth was dominated for too 
long by African issues. Does that strike chords with you? 
 
KT:  It didn’t occur to me as a personal concern, but I was happy when the 
interests of the small states became pushed up the agenda. I was very happy 
with that. And, if it was a concern before, it probably brought some fairness 
and equity into the whole thing. 
 
SO:  Was Don McKinnon also useful, as Secretary General, in arguing the 
issues of small states? Particularly with the OECD on tax arrangements: 
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were you kept informed? Were you involved in any of those 
discussions? 
 
KT:  We had not been directly involved, but we would get documentation from the 
Forum – just to advise us on what’s been going on. Don was a good support 
for Fiji at the time, when we were under the sanctions. So, you would still 
have that door open here. He would ring up for instance, and talk. 
 
SO:  Yes, he’s got a very energetic, informal style. 
 
KT:  Yes, and we’d have that direct access to Don. 
 
SO:  Was that of use to you? 
 
KT:  Yes. And, I mean, it was just a good feeling. You know, that we are still being 
considered as a group member. 
 
SO:  Yes.  I’ve interviewed Don McKinnon twice. As a former politician, he 
has emphasised this very question of informality – good contacts and 
good chemistry between heads. Politicians are a very particular group, 
he argues. 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  They’re not diplomats, they’re politicians! 
 
KT:  Yes. Don was great in breaking the formality. 
 
SO:  He said he benefited very much from New Zealand being a smaller state 
that understood a Pacific way of thinking. Would you say that is true? 
 
KT:  He certainly had a good grasp of the Pacific and the Forum. And I think that’s 
what attracted him to Fiji and to keep that close relationship; I think he really 
believed that the Commonwealth can do a lot more for the Pacific and new 
ideas emerged. But I think the problem with the Commonwealth was really 
the resources that did not back up the ideas. 
 
SO:  Yes. Well, as you’ve just indicated, one of the key resources of the 
Commonwealth has been the Queen. 
 
KT:  Yes. 
 
SO:  What does that then say for the Commonwealth going forward? Do you 
see it continuing through inertia? Do you see it continuing because it 
exists, and therefore people will use it? Is it going to become an 
increasingly insignificant inter-governmental organisation, but with the 
civil society links being, really, the energy and focus? Is the Headship, 
do you feel, going to Prince Charles, as the Queen’s successor? 
 
KT:  Well, the Head creates the sentimental value of the organisation, but that’s 
not going to make the organisation more relevant. I think what is going to 
make the Commonwealth relevant are the projects and the programmes that 
it runs. More relevant, more equipped, with resources going forward. We 
would love to have the Queen stay there forever, but that’s impossible. Even 
if Prince Charles comes in, that is a continuity of the Royal Family’s interest in 
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the Commonwealth. But, I think, going forward, the Commonwealth needs to 
equip itself with greater resources: because that is what the small countries 
are waiting for. They love ideas, but if those ideas – and it’s happened on a 
few occasions in the Pacific – are not backed by resources, they are no good. 
So, the Commonwealth has to become more relevant, and that relevance will 
come with ideas backed up with resources. 
 
SO:  Yes. I agree, Sir. Thank you very much indeed. 
 
KT:  I’ve spoken too much. 
 
SO:  On the contrary! Thank you again. 
 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
